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BUSINESS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE
ROBERTS COURT: A PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT
Jonathan H. Adler*
It did not take long for the Roberts Court to earn its
reputation as a "pro-business" Court. Even before publication
of Jeffrey Rosen's much-discussed New York Times Magazine
article Supreme Court, Inc.,' many commentators had
proclaimed that this Court looks out for business. Indeed,
some were ready to make this charge before the current Court
had sat two full terms together.2 According to these accounts,
*Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. This paper was prepared for the
Santa Clara Law Review symposium on "Big Business and the Roberts Court,"
January 23, 2009. The author would like to thank Ted Frank and Michael
Greve for comments on a draft of this article. The author is responsible for any
remaining error or inanities.
1. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM
(Magazine), at 38. This article provoked substantial commentary and criticism,
some of which is discussed in a series of posts. See Posting of Jonathan Adler,
Ilya Somin, & Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1205805605.shtml (Mar. 17, 2008, 22:10-Mar. 20,
2008, 00:18).
2. See, e.g, Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN
BAG 423, 432-37 (2007) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply]
(explaining that the "conservatism" of the Roberts Court was "manifest in its
being more protective of business interests than its recent predecessors"); see
also Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Pro-Business Decision Hews to Pattern of
Roberts Court, WASH. POST, Jun. 22, 2007, at D01; Business Reigns Supreme,
WASH. POST, July 1, 2007, at F03; Nick Timiraos, Hot Topic: Roberts Court
Unites on Business, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2007, at A5 ("The first full term of the
Roberts Court ended this past week with rulings that pushed the law in a
direction favored by business."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court:
Sharp Turn to the Right, CAL. B. J., Aug. 2007, http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/
calbar-cbj.jsp?sCategoryPath=/Home/Attorney%2OResources/California%2OBar
%20Journal/August2007&sCatHtmlPath=cbj/2007-08_TH_01-supremecourt.ht
ml&sCatHtmlTitle=Top%20Headlines; Tony Mauro, High Court Reveals a
Mind for Business, LEGAL TIMES, July 2, 2007, http://www.wlf.org/upload/07020
7legaltimes.pdf. These commentaries appeared at or near the end of the
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the addition of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate
Justice Samuel Alito has made the Court more receptive to
business interests, and more likely to side with corporations
against individual employees or consumers.'
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the claim that
the Roberts Court is "pro-business" with particular attention
to the Court's approach to business concerns in
environmental law cases. This is necessarily a tentative
enterprise. As of this writing, the Roberts Court has been
together for fewer than four full terms.4 The Court has
decided only sixteen environmental cases, and two potentially
significant business-related environmental cases are pending.
Nevertheless, examination of the environmental law cases
decided to date may help illuminate the extent of the Court's
concern for business interests.
Environmental law cases often pit business interests
against other social values, such as public health and welfare,
species preservation, and resource conservation.
Environmental cases almost always involve business
litigants, if not as parties, then as amici curiae. Even where
business groups are not directly involved, environmental law
decisions tend to have implications for the way business is
conducted. Environmental law decisions can have
substantial economic impacts on corporations, resource-
dependent communities, and private landowners.
Review of the environmental law decisions of the Roberts
Court to date reveals no evidence of a "pro-business" bias.
This does not disprove the claim that the Roberts Court is
pro-business. There are relatively few data points, so the lack
of evidence for a pro-business orientation could be an artifact
of the specific mix of environmental cases heard by the Court.
While the sixteen environmental cases decided to date
Supreme Court's October 2006 term. At this point, John Roberts had been
Chief Justice for two terms, but Samuel Alito had only been an Associate
Justice for a term and a half. The Senate confirmed Justice Alito on January
31, 2006.
3. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply, supra note 2, at 424 ([T]he
Court tended to favor businesses over employees and consumers.").
4. The enterprise is particularly tentative because of the Court's small
docket. With fewer cases decided each term, the likelihood that any given term
(or combination of terms) is representative of the Court's overall orientation is
reduced.
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implicate several major environmental statutes and span a
wide range of legal issues, there is no reason to assume these
cases are broadly representative of the field. It is possible
that the business claims in these cases were not particularly
strong, or that any concern for business was outweighed by
other preferences, perhaps even a preference for greater
environmental protection. Nonetheless, the lack of evidence
for a pro-business orientation may offer some indication of
how this Court will approach business claims in the context of
environmental law in the years ahead.
The next section of this article considers what it could
mean to say that the Roberts Court is "pro-business," and
identifies several qualifications that should be attached to
any such claims. Part II examines the environmental law
decisions of the Roberts Court, and explains how these
decisions, taken as a whole, do not support the claim that the
Roberts Court is "pro-business." Part III suggests the Roberts
Court's environmental cases are actually more "pro-
government" than "pro-business." The paper then concludes.
I. IS THE ROBERTS COURT "PRO-BUSINESS"?
Claims that the Roberts Court is a "pro-business" court
are quite common. In Supreme Court, Inc., Rosen claimed
that the Court has become exceedingly sympathetic to
business concerns.5 A subsequent New York Times editorial
decried the Roberts Court's "reputation for being reflexively
pro-business."6 Kiplinger reported that a "pro-business
judiciary" is likely to be among the most significant legacies
of the Bush Administration.7 A reporter for ProPublica
lamented, "[P]ro-worker decisions have so far been exceptions
in a pro-business record."' Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has
gone further, claiming "the Roberts Court is the most pro-
business Court of any since the mid-1930s."
5. Rosen, supra note 1.
6. Editorial, The Court and Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2008, at A18.
7. Jonathan Crawford, Bush's Lasting Legacy: A Pro-Business Judiciary,
KIPLINGER Bus. FORECAST, Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.kiplinger.com/businessre
source/forecast/archive/BushLeaves-a LastingLegacy_080310.html.
8. Chisun Lee, Another Economic Election Issue: Supreme Court
Nominations, PROPUBLICA, Oct. 17, 2008, http://www.propublica.orgarticle/ano
ther-economic-election-issue-supreme-court-nominations- 1017.
9. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L.
2009] 945
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The Roberts Court appears to have taken a greater
interest in business-related cases than prior courts. ' ° Such
cases have accounted for one-third to one-half of the Court's
docket in recent years.1 The shrunken size of the Court's
docket further serves to magnify this apparent trend (though
it also makes the mix of cases each term less representative of
the Court's work overall). Whereas the Court would hear
approximately 150 cases per term in the 1980s, the Court
issued opinions in fewer than seventy cases each in October
Terms 2006 and 2007. As the Court takes fewer total cases,
the same number of business-related cases occupy a greater
share of the Court's work, heightening the perception that the
business of this Court is the law of business.
Most of those who charge that the Robert Courts is "pro-
business" no doubt mean something more than that the Court
is more interested in resolving business-related legal
disputes. Rosen, for instance, characterizes the Court's
recent pro-business tilt as an "ideological sea change" from
prior eras in which the Court was more sympathetic to
"progressive and consumer groups."12 Dean Chemerinsky
argues the Court tends "to favor business over employees and
consumers."13
Decisions in which a corporation prevails are taken as
evidence that the Court is pro-business. Rosen notes that the
litigation arm of the Chamber of Commerce has fared
particularly well in recent terms.'4 But knowing that private
companies were on one side or another of a given case may
not tell us all that much by itself. Many areas of business law
REV. 947, 962 (2008). For a response to this article, see Jonathan H. Adler,
Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
983 (2008).
10. Michael Greve, Does the Court Mean Business?, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK,
Sept. 2007, at 1 ("The Court's increased attention to business related cases-
even as its overall docket has continued to shrink-is indeed eye-catching.").
11. There is some imprecision in the numbers because not all commentators
define "business-related" in the same way. See Greve, supra note 10, at 1 ("In
the 2006 term, twenty-five of sixty-seven cases dealt with business-related
issues."); Rosen, supra note 1 ("Forty percent of the cases the [C]ourt heard last
term involved business interests, up from around 30 percent in recent years.");
Mauro, supra note 2 ("Fully half of the Court's 71 cases involved business.").
12. Rosen, supra note 1.
13. Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply, supra note 2, at 424.
14. Rosen, supra note 1.
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routinely pit corporations against each other, and many
businesses stand to gain from regulatory or judicial
intervention in the economy. Some business groups were
among those supporting the petitioners in Massachusetts v.
EPA,"5 but few would argue that the Court's decision to
unleash federal regulation of greenhouse gases was "pro-
business." Furthermore, knowing that the Chamber of
Commerce has been a successful litigant or amicus curiae
could say as much about their selection of cases-or even the
legal merits of the arguments-as it does about the Court's
orientation.1
6
Consider, briefly, the Court's antitrust decisions, which
many commentators have pointed to as evidence of the
Court's emerging pro-business orientation. Rosen, for
instance, reported that "the Roberts Court has heard seven
[antitrust cases] in its first two terms-and all of them were
decided in favor of the corporate defendants." 7 This is true.
But the plaintiffs in all but one of these cases were businesses
as well.'" So while businesses have tended to prevail in the
Roberts Court's antitrust decisions, they have tended to lose
as well. 9 Because antitrust cases tend to "pit business
against business," as Rosen acknowledges,"° knowing the
identity of the prevailing party does not tell us much about
15. Among those organizations that originally petitioned the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gases in 1999 were Applied Power Technologies, Bio-Fuels
America, the California Solar Energy Industries Association, Clements
Environmental Corporation, New Mexico Solar Energy Association, and Solar
Energy Industries Association. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511
n.15 (2007). Among the organizations and corporations filing briefs in support
of the petitioners in the case were the Aspen Skiing Corporation, Calpine
Corporation, and Entergy Corporation.
16. For instance, a review of the cases in which the Chamber participated
before the Supreme Court shows that participation by the Solicitor General's
office appears to be a better predictor of whether the "pro-business" side will
prevail in a given case. See generally Robin S. Conrad, The Roberts Court and
the Myth of a Pro-Business Bias, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 997 (2009); Sri
Srinivasan & Bradley W. Joondeph, Business, the Roberts Court, and the
Solicitor General: Why the Recent Supreme Court's Decisions May Not Reveal
Very Much, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1103 (2009).
17. Rosen, supra note 1.
18. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
19. See Posting of Josh Wright to Truth on the Market,
http://www.truthonthemarket.com/index.php?s=Are+the+Roberts+Court+Antitr
ust+Decisions+Really+Pro-Business%3F (Mar. 20, 2008, 17:55).
20. Rosen, supra note 1.
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whether the decisions are "pro-business." Moreover, plaintiff
or defendant win rates tell us very little about the underlying
merits of the cases.2' Unless one assumes that the Court's
cases in any given area represent a random sample of the
available cases, which is unlikely, any analysis must account
for the merits of the underlying cases. Reversing an outlier
pro-plaintiff decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit 22 is not the same as overturning decades of
settled law to benefit defendants,23 yet a pure quantitative
analysis focusing on prevailing parties could conflate the two.
A more nuanced assessment of these cases could note
that, in the aggregate, they tend to make it more difficult to
challenge business practices as anti-competitive. Dean
Chemerinsky, for instance, notes that several of the Roberts
Court cases have made it "much more difficult to sue
businesses for antitrust violations."24 Yet this does not mean
that the Court's antitrust decisions are "pro-business." Many
antitrust scholars suggest that the Roberts Court is not as
much "pro-business" as it is "pro-consumer welfare," and
consequently, "pro-market." From this perspective, the
Roberts Court has internalized the insights of the Chicago
School of antitrust analysis and seeks to prevent legal
challenges to pro-competitive business arrangements.25 Thus,
Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Leah Brannon argue that the
Roberts Court is "methodically re-working antitrust doctrine
21. See Posting of Josh Wright to Truth on the Market,
http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2008/10/14/abuse-of-plaintiff-win-rates-as-
evidence-that-antitrust-law-is-too-lenient] (Oct. 14, 2008, 12:22).
22. See, e.g., Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164
(2006) (overturning Ninth Circuit decision holding that Robinson-Patman Act's
prohibition on price discrimination applies to special order products made for
and sold to pre-identified customers after process of competitive bidding);
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (overturning Ninth Circuit decision
that it could be per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act for a lawful,
economically integrated joint venture to set the prices at which it sells its
products).
23. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
(overturning Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jon D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911),
which had held vertical price restraints are per se illegal under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act).
24. Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply, supra note 2, at 436.
25. See generally Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago
School of Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L,
Autumn 2007, at 25.
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to bring it into alignment with modern economic
understanding."26 From this perspective, the pro-business or
pro-defendant pattern of the Roberts Court's antitrust
decisions could just as easily be described as "pro-consumer"
or "pro-competition."
The foregoing highlights that when evaluating claims
that the Roberts Court is "pro-business," it is important to
ask: "compared to what?" Depending upon one's baseline, the
claim that a court is "pro-business" can mean quite different
things. There is a difference between eliminating a long-
standing cause of action against business defendants and
refusing to open the door to a new generation of suits against
corporations. Both are, in a sense, "pro-business," but they
are quite distinct.
The current Court may look overly sympathetic to
business when compared to the progressive crusading of some
prior Courts. As Rosen notes, there is no Justice ready to
follow William 0. Douglas's counsel to" 'bend the law in favor
of the environment and against the corporations.' "27 Yet this
hardly makes Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito
reincarnations of the pre-New Deal Horsemen. Thus far
there is little evidence that either of the newest justices-or
any of the current justices for that matter-is particularly
eager to bend the law and stretch conventional legal doctrines
for the benefit of businesses. With the possible exception of
the Court's punitive damages decisions (some of which,
incidentally, actually pre-date the Roberts Court),2" the Court
has steered away from developing or enforcing constitutional
rules that would preclude regulation or sanction of business
activities.
It is likewise important to consider whether in rendering
"pro-business" decisions the Court is itself shifting the law in
a pro-business direction or merely ratifying a pro-business
legislative deal or administrative ruling. While the former
may be evidence of an actual "pro-business" bias, the latter
26. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Leah Brannon, Antitrust Decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court, 1967 to 2007, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2007, at
3,4.
27. Rosen, supra note 1.
28. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding "grossly
excessive" punitive damage awards violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
20091 949
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
may illustrate nothing more than deference to the political
branches, and may only yield "pro-business" outcomes so long
as the political branches are sympathetic to business
interests. A highly deferential court may seem quite "pro-
business" when upholding the decisions of Republican-
controlled agencies, but much less so once a Democratic
administration is in control. Data showing that the Court
often sides with the Solicitor General's office in business cases
could well be evidence that the Court is more deferential to
the federal government than it is objectively "pro-business."
Moreover, a more nuanced examination of the pattern of
decisions in business-related cases may reveal that what
appears to be a "pro-business" orientation may be something
else entirely.29
Another distinction to keep in mind is whether the Court
is adopting business-friendly default rules or entrenching pro-
business rules. So, for instance, there is a meaningful
difference between decisions in which the Court adopts a
statutory interpretation favored by business interests, which
Congress retains the ability to overturn (as with Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co."), and decisions in which the
Court announces a substantive rule of constitutional law that
benefits business (as in some of the punitive damages cases).
In the former instance, the Court may be doing nothing more
than deferring to the legislature on whether to shift the law
in a less business-friendly direction. In the latter, the Court
is entrenching a substantive rule that will benefit business
forever. Thus, in Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court rejected the invitation to
recognize "scheme liability" for securities fraud. 1  The
Warren Court may have been less reluctant to open the door
29. For example, former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr suggests that the
business cases show that the Court "is not so much pro-business as it is
massively skeptical of civil litigation, especially nationwide civil litigation."
Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court and the Business Cases, 25 PEPP. L. REV.
541, 541 (2008).
30. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
Congress subsequently overturned this decision with the Lily Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbette
r-web.html?hp.
31. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
761 (2007).
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to such litigation, yet there is nothing in Justice Kennedy's
Stoneridge opinion that would preclude Congress from
authorizing such suits in the future. Insofar as the vast
majority of cases in which the Roberts Court has adopted
"pro-business" outcomes are subject to legislative or
administrative override, this should inform our assessment of
the extent to which it is a meaningfully "pro-business" court,
particularly as recent political trends may portend a less
business-friendly legislative and executive branch.
Given the limited period of time to evaluate the Roberts
Court's approach to business cases, any assessment is
necessarily tentative. After the Court's 2007 decision in
Ledbetter,32 many were ready to claim the Court favors
business employers over employees. Yet in several
subsequent employment discrimination cases, the Court sided
with employees." Generalizations about the Court's
approach to employment discrimination based upon Ledbetter
were premature and inaccurate. Because the Roberts Court
is still a work in progress, any conclusory assessment may
come with an expiration date.
With all of the above qualifications in mind, I am willing
to offer a tentative assessment of the Court's posture toward
business cases. To the extent that the Roberts Court is pro-
business, it is so not because it has embraced an aggressive
agenda to either impose constitutional constraints on the
government's power to regulate economic activity, or to
rewrite the law to favor business interests. Rather, the
Roberts Court can be called "pro-business" insofar as it is
sympathetic to some basic business-oriented legal claims, it
reads statutes narrowly, it resists finding implied causes of
action, it has adopted a skeptical view of antitrust
complaints, and it does not place its finger on the scales to
assist non-business litigants. This approach is highly
deferential to the political branches, particularly the
legislature, and will produce "pro-business" results only
insofar as the other branches adopt or maintain relatively
32. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
33. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S. Ct.
846 (2009); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008); Gomez-Perez
v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S.
Ct. 2395 (2008).
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business-friendly policies. With a more interventionist
Congress or less sympathetic Solicitor General's office, this
approach might not be "pro-business" at all.
II. ARE THE ROBERTS COURT'S ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
"PRO-BUSINESS"?
Environmental cases have been a small, but significant,
portion of the Roberts Court's docket. The Court decided
thirteen environmental law cases in its first three years. It
further agreed to hear five environmental cases in the
October Term 2008, three of which have been decided at the
time of this writing. The eighteen environmental cases heard
by the Roberts Court are listed in table 1.
As already noted, this is an admittedly small set of cases
from which to draw definitive conclusions, but they can form
the basis of a preliminary assessment. Another important
qualification is that viewing environmental cases as posing
business interests on one side and environmental interests on
the other is overly simplistic. Environmental policy decisions
tend to benefit some business interests even as they may
impose costs on others.35  Enactment of some federal
environmental laws was actively supported by corporate
interests. Indeed, the federalization of environmental law
was driven, in part, by national firms that seeking displace
variable and potentially more stringent state standards.3 6 In
34. See infra app., tbl.l. For purposes of this study, I opted not to include
United States v. Navajo Nation as an "environmental" case. While this case
involved a dispute over royalties for a coal lease on Indian lands, it did not
involve any significant environmental issues. Had it been included, however, it
would have been considered a "pro-business" decision in which the government's
position also prevailed. See United States v. Navajo Nation, No. 07-1410, 2009
WL 901510 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2009).
35. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE
REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith Jr. eds., 1992); Jonathan H. Adler,
Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM 1 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000); Todd J.
Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999).
36. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian,
Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental
Law, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG. 313, 326-29 (1985); see also Adler, supra note 35;
David Schoenbrod, Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards, in
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 259, 260-62 (Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill eds.,
1997).
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some cases, business interests have sought to use regulatory
policy as a means of achieving comparative advantage, often
by disadvantaging competitors. Environmental
controversies often pit one set of industry groups against
another, as when incinerators and cement kilns faced off on
air emission standards, or when oil and agribusiness fight
over energy policy.38 As noted above, businesses that expect
to gain financially from the imposition of regulatory controls
on greenhouse gases supported the petitioners in
Massachusetts v. EPA, even if the majority of the business
community was on the other side.39
Despite the prevalence of business interests on all sides
of many environmental issues, in most environmental cases
before the Supreme Court, it is possible to identify the
position that is supported by the balance of business groups
and that will produce a rule that, on the whole, works to the
benefit of business. Such decisions may well have other
beneficiaries, and may not be motivated by any concern for
business interests, but they can nonetheless be evaluated
based upon their effect upon the business community.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, whether a given case
embodies a "pro-business" outcome is an entirely different
question from whether the decision was substantively correct.
For the purposes of this paper, labeling a decision as "pro-
business" is not a proxy for the merits. The merits of the
cases, individually or as a whole, are a subject for another
paper.
Taken together, the Roberts Court's decisions in
environmental cases show no evidence of a "pro-business"
bias or orientation. The Roberts Court adopted what could be
considered the "pro-business" position in eight of the sixteen
environmental cases it has decided thus far.4" If we step back
from the numbers, and consider the substantive effects of the
37. See supra note 35 and sources cited therein.
38. See Adler, supra note 35.
39. See supra note 15. See generally Stuart Buck & Bruce Yandle,
Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
177(2002).
40. An earlier assessment, looking at just the Roberts Court's first seven
environmental decisions, likewise found "no discernable pro-business bias thus
far." See David Schultz, Give A Hoot, Don't Pollute: The Roberts Court and the
Environment, 17 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 191 (2009).
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cases, there is even less evidence of this Court is particularly
business-friendly. Most of the business wins occurred in
relatively narrow cases that had little effect on pre-existing
law, while several of the losses were quite dramatic and will
have profound effects on economic interests. The aggregate
effect of the pro-business decisions on environmental law and
future environmental litigation will be quite meager, while
the less business-friendly decisions could have substantial
legal and practical consequences for many years to come.
Consider the three most significant business "wins" in
environmental cases decided in the past three years: Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker,41 National Association of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,42 and Rapanos v. United
States.4 3 In Exxon Shipping v. Baker the Court unanimously
rejected Exxon's claim that punitive damage awards were
preempted by federal law and confined its holding limiting
punitive damage awards to cases arising under the federal
common law of maritime.44 The Court's decision in National
Association of Home Builders imposed a significant limitation
on the application of the Endangered Species Act to pre-
existing statutory obligations, but in doing so it affirmed
historical agency practice and long-standing lower court
decisions on the question. In Rapanos the Court adopted a
potentially significant limitation on federal jurisdiction over
wetlands lacking a "significant nexus" to navigable waters,
but also reaffirmed that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
and Environmental Protection Agency retain substantial
authority to define "significant nexus" so as to reclaim much
of the jurisdictional ground that was lost.
Insofar as these decisions are "pro-business," they are all
quite modest. Solid base hits, to be sure, but not home runs.
Their significance pales in comparison to Massachusetts v.
EPA,45 by far the most significant environmental decision
decided by the Roberts Court thus far. Combined with the
other cases in which the Court sided against business
41. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
42. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644
(2007).
43. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
44. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2618-19.
45. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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interests, it is difficult to argue that the Roberts Court's
environmental decisions have been of net benefit to business
interests.
Eight of the Roberts Court's environmental decisions
could be considered "pro-business." These decisions are
Rapanos v. United States,46 Rockwell International Corp. v.
United States,47 United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,48
National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife,49 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,"° Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,5 ' Summers v. Earth Island
Institute,52 and Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper Inc.53
Exxon Shipping v. Baker received substantial attention
as a "pro-business" decision in part because of its storied
history, and in part because it involved the largest punitive-
damage award in American history.54 In March 1989, the
Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground off the coast of
Alaska, spilling nearly eleven million barrels of oil into Prince
William Sound. Largely due to the sound's remote location,
cleanup efforts were delayed and the spill quickly spread to
cover thousands of square miles of ocean. Exxon pleaded
guilty to various environmental violations, and several
lawsuits followed, one of which led to a jury award of just over
$500 million in compensatory damages and $5 billion in
punitive damages, subsequently reduced to $2.5 billion on
appeal.55
A divided Court struck down the punitive damage award,
holding that a compensatory-to-punitive ratio greater than
one-to-one is excessive under the federal common law of
admiralty. 6 This was a significant victory for Exxon, but it
was a less significant victory for business generally. First,
46. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
47. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007).
48. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007).
49. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644
(2007).
50. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
51. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
52. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
53. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., No. 07-558, 2009 WL 838242 (U.S.
Apr. 1, 2009).
54. Rosen, supra note 1.
55. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.
56. Id. at 2634.
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and perhaps most importantly, the Court's holding limiting
the award of punitive damages to an amount equal to the
compensatory damages was confined to the federal maritime
common law, and there is little reason to believe the Court
would impose an equivalent limit in constitutional challenges
to punitive damages. Among other things, two of the Justices
who joined the judgment of the Court--Justices Thomas and
Scalia--did so explicitly on the grounds that the Court's
holding was so limited and reaffirmed their opposition to
imposing any constitutional limitations on punitive damages
in state court. Moreover, the Court allowed the imposition
of punitive damages even though the underlying conduct was
neither intentional nor profitable for Exxon, leading some
commentators to suggest the decision could be "a floor, rather
than a ceiling" for cases in which the defendant's conduct was
more egregious.58
While the Court's punitive damages holding grabbed the
headlines, another aspect of Exxon Shipping could well have
a greater impact on environmental law. Specifically, the
Court unanimously rejected Exxon's argument that punitive
damages in water pollution cases are preempted by the Clean
Water Act (the "CWA"). 59 Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Souter explained there was little indication Congress
sought to "occupy the entire field of pollution remedies" and
no reason to believe that "punitive damages for private harms
will have any frustrating effect on the CWA remedial
scheme." 0 This is potentially significant as common law
claims for punitive damages under federal maritime law are
relatively rare, whereas industry claims that state tort
remedies are preempted by federal statute are more common.
Moreover, the Court's anti-preemption holding in Exxon
Shipping is rather conspicuous as business preemption claims
have prevailed in the majority of preemption cases decided by
the Roberts Court thus far.
The Court's decision in Rapanos was a victory for
business interests insofar as it reaffirmed the Court's prior
57. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. See Ted Frank, The Era of Big Punitive Damage Awards Is Not Over,
WALL ST. J., July 10, 2008, at A13.
59. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2619.
60. Id.
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holding that federal regulatory jurisdiction over "waters of
the United States" is limited.6 In Rapanos, a slim and
divided majority rejected the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit's expansive interpretation of federal regulatory
jurisdiction, but could not agree on a single rationale. The
Court splintered 4-1-4, limiting the decision's scope and
creating uncertainty about the precise contours of the Court's
holding. Despite the failure to produce a majority opinion,
the Rapanos court reaffirmed the central holding of the
Court's 2000 decision in Solid Waste Agency v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers62 that "waters of the United States"
only extend to those waters and wetlands that have a
"significant nexus" to truly navigable waters and that are
"inseparably bound up with the 'waters' of the United
States,"6'  and made clear that CWA jurisdiction has
meaningful limits.
Four of the justices in Rapanos joined an opinion by
Justice Scalia holding that federal jurisdiction over "waters of
the United States" under the Clean Water Act could only
extend to "those wetlands with a continuous surface
connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United States' in
their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between
'waters' and wetlands."64 A fifth justice, Justice Kennedy, held
that "the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the
existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in
question and navigable waters in a traditional sense."65
After Rapanos, federal regulators must make a greater
showing than many lower courts had required to assert
61. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). For a more extended
analysis of the Rapanos decision, see Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with
Rapanos: Revisiting "Waters of the United States" and the Limits of Federal
Wetland Regulation, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Adler,
Reckoning] and Jonathan H. Adler, Once More, With Feeling: Reaffirming the
Limits of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN
WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 81 (L. Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007).
62. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
63. Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
121, 134 (1985)).
64. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.).
65. Id. at 779 (emphasis added) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment);
see also id. at 767 ("Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is
lacking."). According to Justice Kennedy, "navigable waters" are "waters that
are or were navigable in fact, or that could reasonably be so made." Id. at 758.
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federal jurisdiction over privately owned wetlands adjacent to
or near tributaries of navigable waters. Insofar as federal
regulations purport to define "waters of the United States" to
include intrastate waters, "the use, degradation, or
destruction of which could affect interstate commerce or
"667foreign commerce, "66 and wetlands adjacent to such waters,67
they exceed the scope of federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction.
Yet the benefits of Rapanos for the regulated community have
been rather limited. The divided nature of the Court's
decision in Rapanos has resulted in some amount of
regulatory uncertainty, as lower courts, federal regulators,
and the regulated community struggled to sort out the
decision's implications.68  Furthermore, neither of the
opinions of those Justices who joined in the judgment impose
stringent limits on future assertions of regulatory
jurisdiction. Justice Kennedy's opinion provides federal
regulators with ample room to delineate the sorts of ecological
factors that may be used to demonstrate that there is a
"significant nexus" between a given wetland and navigable
waters. Justice Scalia's opinion also provides more leeway
than some may realize, as key portions of the opinion are
conspicuously couched in the language of "step two" of the
Chevron doctrine, suggesting at least some of the concurring
justices would accept a more expansive reading of CWA
jurisdiction adopted pursuant to a notice-and-comment
rulemaking.69
The Court was even more deferential to the federal
government in another Clean Water Act case, Entergy Corp.
v. Riverkeeper, in which the Court upheld the Environmental
Protection Agency's reliance upon cost-benefit analysis in
66. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2008).
67. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7).
68. Some of the lower court decisions interpreting Rapanos are discussed in
Adler, Reckoning, supra note 61.
69. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 ("The Corps' expansive interpretation of
the 'waters of the United States' is ... not 'based on a permissible construction
of the statute.' ") (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984)). Under the Chevron doctrine, when reviewing an agency's
statutory construction, the Court first considers whether Congress has directly
addressed the question at issue. If not, and the relevant statutory language is
ambiguous, the Court will then defer to the agency's interpretation, provided
(among other things) it is "based on a permissible construction" of the relevant
statutory text. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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setting technology standards for powerplant cooling water
intake structures.70 Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act
requires adoption of the "best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact" from the
withdrawal of water for the cooling of power facilities.71
Pursuant to this requirement, in 2004 the EPA adopted
performance standards requiring existing covered facilities to
dramatically reduce the mortality of aquatic organisms
through the use of various technologies the EPA deemed to be
"commercially available and economically practicable."72 The
EPA declined to adopt more stringent standards, such as a
requirement that all regulated facilities adopt closed-cycle
cooling systems or their equivalent, because they were
deemed too costly in relation to the additional environmental
benefits from adopting such technologies. Specifically, the
EPA concluded a more stringent standard would increase
industry compliance costs nine-fold but not generate
significant offsetting environmental benefits.73
Environmentalist organizations challenged the cooling
water intake standards, arguing that the EPA cannot
consider economic costs and benefits when setting standards
under Section 316(b) in all but the most extreme
circumstances. Six Justices rejected this argument,
concluding that the relevant statutory language is sufficiently
ambiguous to allow the EPA to consider the relevant costs
and benefits when identifying the "best technology available
for minimizing adverse environmental impact." Writing for
five Justices, Justice Scalia explained that the "best"
technology could be that which generates the least adverse
environmental impacts, but could also be "the technology that
most efficiently" reduces adverse environmental impacts.74
Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
likewise concluded that the Clean Water Act permitted at
least the limited use of cost-benefit comparisons in setting
70. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., No 07-588, 2009 WL 838242 (U.S.
Apr. 1, 2009).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
72. 69 Fed. Reg. 41576, 41602 (July 9, 2004). These so-called "Phase II"
standards apply to facilities that withdraw at least fifty million gallons of water
per day, at least one-quarter of which is used for cooling purposes. Id. at 41576.
73. See Entergy, 2009 WL 838242, at *4.
74. Id. at *5.
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technology standards for cooling water intake structures.75
While the Court upheld the use of cost-benefit
comparisons under Section 316(b), it also stressed that
whether to rely upon such analyses was left to the discretion
of the EPA. Under the Court's reading, the relevant statutory
language neither required nor prohibited the use of such
analyses, and the EPA remains free to alter its regulatory
approach in the future. Thus, while the Court upheld a
relatively pro-business regulatory policy in Entergy, it also
left the EPA ample ability to implement Section 316(b) in a
more stringent and less business friendly manner in the
future.
In National Association of Home Builders, the Court
decided on the application of the Endangered Species Act (the
"ESA") consultation requirements to arguably non-
discretionary decisions under other laws. 76  At issue was
whether the Environmental Protection Agency was required
to engage in a section seven consultation under the ESA
before transferring permitting authority to a state
environmental agency as provided for under the Clean Water
Act. Section seven of the ESA requires all federal agencies to
consult with the Fish & Wildlife Service or the National
Marine Fisheries Service to ensure that no action
"authorized, funded, or carried out" by such agencies will
jeopardize an endangered or threatened species.77 Under the
CWA, however, the EPA is required to approve the transfer of
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permitting authority to a state if nine statutorily specified
criteria are met.78 In this case, the EPA approved the
transfer of permitting authority to the State of Arizona, even
though this could lead to the issuance of NPDES permits
without considering the potential impact on certain
endangered species, because it determined that Arizona met
the nine criteria specified in the CWA.
National Association of Home Builders was a close case.
Upholding the EPA determination would blunt the impact of
75. Id. at *16-19 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644
(2007).
77. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
78. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (2006).
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the ESA, but would keep the permit transfer provisions of the
CWA intact. Reversing the EPA determination could
significantly expand the universe of agency decisions now
subject to potential ESA consultation. Faced with this choice,
the Court sided with the EPA's interpretation. This was a
"pro-business" decision because the Court refused to impose
the ESA's consultation requirements on agency decisions
traditionally made in accordance with specified statutory
criteria. The impact of this decision is rather minimal,
however, as it does little to change the status quo.79 Thus,
while a contrary decision might have been a significant loss
for business interests, the Court's decision may not amount to
much of a victory.
The obligation of federal agencies to take actions
protecting animal species was also at issue in Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, in which the Court was
asked to resolve a conflict between the military and marine
mammals.8 0  Several environmental organizations had
successfully sought a preliminary injunction against the
Navy's use of mid-frequency active sonar because it had failed
to complete an Environmental Impact Statement. As first
presented to the Court, it looked like a potential blockbuster,
raising interesting separation of powers questions, such as
the ability of the executive to authorize noncompliance with
environmental statutes. Yet as it happened, the ultimate
disposition of the case was rather narrow. Ruling 6-3, the
Court overturned the preliminary injunction on the grounds
that the U.S. Court of Appeals had applied too loose a
standard and that that the potential threat to marine
mammals was outweighed by the national interest in military
readiness.8 ' As with National Association of Home Builders,
79. Two of the three appellate courts to have considered this question
reached the same conclusion as the Supreme Court. See Am. Forest & Paper
Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998); Platte River Whooping Crane
Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 962 F.2d 27
(D.C. Cir. 1992). The third was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
See Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd 551 U.S.
644 (2007).
80. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
81. Id. at 376 ("[Elven if plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury from the
Navy's training exercises, any such injury is outweighed by the public interest
and the Navy's interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors. A proper
consideration of these factors alone requires denial of the requested injunctive
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this was an outcome favored by business interests, but is
unlikely to have a substantial practical effect. Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion for the Court in Winter stresses the
importance of military readiness throughout, making it likely
that the decision will have minimal effects in other contexts. 2
Summers v. Earth Island Institute was a small and
predictable win for the pro-business decision insofar as it
reaffirmed the Court's long-standing requirement that
citizen-suit plaintiffs suffer an injury-in-fact in order to
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing. 3  In
Summers, environmentalist plaintiffs had sought to challenge
a revision of U.S. Forest Service regulations governing small-
scale fire-rehabilitation and timber-salvage projects. In 2003,
they challenged the regulatory revisions as applied to a
specific project, but the government eventually settled,
creating a standing problem insofar as the plaintiffs sought to
maintain their suit against the underlying procedural rule
change. No longer able to identify a specific project that
would be affected by the rule that could be the source of their
injury, the Supreme Court held, 5-4, that they no longer had
standing to maintain their suit because they could not
demonstrate they would suffer an "injury-in-fact" that is both
actual or imminent and concrete and particularized. Just as
the plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife could not
satisfy the injury requirement with their someday intentions
to visit endangered species threatened by the government's
failure to enforce Endangered Species Act limitations on
federally funded projects overseas, the Summers plaintiffs
could not satisfy the injury requirement by arguing that
implementation of the Forest Service's regulation would
result in an unlawful timber-salvage project on an as-yet-
relief.").
82. Chief Justice Roberts's decision opened quoting President George
Washington: "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of
preserving peace." Id. at 370 (quoting George Washington, U.S. President, First
Annual Address (Jan. 8, 1790), in 1 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 68 (2004)). The opinion ended
quoting President Theodore Roosevelt that "the only way in which a navy can
ever be made efficient is by practice at sea, under all the conditions which would
have to be met if war existed." Id. at 382 (quoting President's Annual Message,
42 CONG. REC. 67, 81 (1907)).
83. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 442 (2009).
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unidentified parcel at some as-yet-unidentified point in the
future.84
By rejecting standing "in the absence of a live dispute
over a concrete application" of specific regulations, 5 Summers
reaffirmed the Court's hostility to programmatic public
interest litigation. The rule reaffirmed in Summers makes it
more difficult to challenge underlying policy changes, as
prospective plaintiffs need to identify how the policy change,
as applied in a specific context, tangibly harms their
interests. Industry amici supported this result insofar as
they sought to reduce citizen-suit litigation against projects
on federal lands, particularly where (as in this case) such
suits result in nationwide injunctions. Resource-using
industries active on federal lands, such as the timber
industry, also sought to insulate the contested Forest Service
rule from legal challenge. Forcing environmentalist groups to
challenge individual applications of a given policy change
would make it more difficult to overturn the underlying rule.
Yet Summers broke no meaningfully new ground in the law of
standing, and was thus not a particularly significant win for
business interests.
The final two pro-business decisions are also rather
minor. In Atlantic Research v. United States, the Court
unanimously affirmed that companies that engage in
voluntary cleanups of hazardous waste sites may pursue
recovery actions against other potentially responsible parties
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA," aka "Superfund"). This case
was a pro-business decision insofar as a private company had
sought cost recovery from the United States government, and
other companies in equivalent situations will be able to seek
cost recovery, as has long been assumed. Yet its pro-business
effect is somewhat limited, as it also opens the door to cost
recovery actions against private firms.
In Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 6 the
Court made it marginally more difficult for alleged
whistleblowers to bring qui tam actions under the False
Claims Act, but did nothing to prevent such suits by the
84. See id. at 1150-51.
85. Id. at 1147.
86. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 548 U.S. 941 (2006).
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federal government itself. One of the primary practical
effects of this decision is that government contractors sued
under the False Claims Act are less likely to face requests for
attorneys fees from such suits, a result business certainly
favors. This may also have the result of reducing the overall
number of such suits. Insofar as it is a victory for business,
however, it is significant for government contractors, not the
business community at large.
Contrasting the cases in which business emerged
victorious with those in which business lost demonstrates
that the Roberts Court's environmental cases have not been,
on the whole, "pro-business.""7  The most important
environmental case decided by the Roberts Court-indeed,
one of the most important cases of any sort decided in the
past three years-was Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the
Court both loosened the standing requirements for litigants
seeking greater federal regulation, expanded the scope of the
Clean Air Act to cover the most ubiquitous byproducts of
industrial civilization, and (as a practical matter) requires
federal regulation of greenhouse gases.8" As a substantive
matter, this case alone is more adverse to business interests
than all of the business "wins" put together. Several singles
don't matter all that much if one's opponent responds with a
grand slam.
As a legal matter, the most significant aspect of
Massachusetts v. EPA may be its treatment of standing. Not
only did the Court apply the traditional requirements for
Article III standing in a particularly undemanding fashion, it
also announced a new rule of "special solicitude" for states
and potentially expanded the ability of citizen suit plaintiffs
to meet standing's causation and redressability requirements.
Whereas Summers largely reaffirmed the Court's traditional
standing requirements, as articulated in Lujan,
Massachusetts opened the door to additional litigation by
those seeking to increase the stringency of federal
environmental regulations.
In a surprising move, the Massachusetts majority
87. It should be reiterated that the claim of this paper is not that these
decisions have been "anti-business." Rather, the claim is simply that there is no
evidence of a pro-business bias or pro-business pattern of decisions.
88. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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proclaimed that state standing claims are "entitled to special
solicitude" in federal court.89 The Court rested this holding
on a century-old case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper.90 In this
case, a downwind state, Georgia, sought judicial relief from
upwind pollution under the federal common law of interstate
nuisance. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, looked
favorably on Georgia's claims and held the state could seek
equitable relief that was potentially unavailable to private
litigants. This case may have established an important
principle about the availability of equitable relief for state
litigants, but it had little to do with Article III standing.
Indeed, this may explain why the case was not cited in a
single brief filed with the Court.9
While the Massachusetts majority could have grounded
their newfound approach to state standing in the framework
provided by prior court decisions, such as Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez,92 it did not. If
vindicating state interests was so important, the Court could
also have relied upon other state sovereign interests, such as
a state's interest in preventing the potential federal
preemption of its own laws. This view was actually urged
upon the Court by state amici.93 Yet the Court did not adopt
the approach actually urged by the state petitioners or amici,
opting to invent a new doctrine of "special solicitude" instead.
This newfound "special solicitude" for state litigants could
help ease the way for greater legal activism by state attorneys
89. Id. at 518.
90. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
91. The first mention of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper in the Massachusetts v.
EPA litigation came during oral argument when it was referenced by Justice
Kennedy. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497
(No. 05-1120).
92. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
93. This argument was made in an amicus curiae brief in Massachusetts v.
EPA submitted on behalf of several states. See Brief of the States of Arizona &
Iowa et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Massachusetts, 549 U.S.
497 (No. 05-1120), available at http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/MassBrie
fs/Mass%20v%20EPA--Amici%2OStates.pdf. For a critique of these alternative
arguments for state standing, see Brief of The Cato Institute and Law
Professors Jonathan H. Adler, James L. Huffman, and Andrew P. Morriss as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497
(2007) (No. 05-1120), at 14-17, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/legalbriefs/
ma v-epa_10-24-06.pdf.
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general, including so-called "regulation by litigation."94
States increasingly use litigation as a means of pursuing
social and environmental policy goals, and Massachusetts v.
EPA could make it easier for state attorneys general to
pursue such strategies in federal court.
The newfound "solicitude" for states was not the only
alteration of standing doctrine in Massachusetts. The Court
also made it easier for prospective petitioners to overcome the
causation and redressability prongs of the Article III standing
requirements. In Lujan the Court had held that the "normal
standards for redressability and immediacy" are relaxed
when a statute vests a litigant with a "procedural right."95
This is the rationale for recognizing environmental litigants'
standing to enforce the National Environmental Policy Act
and other laws that impose only procedural obligations on
regulatory agencies. In Massachusetts the Court concluded
that the petitioners should get the benefit of this relaxed
standing standard. According to Justice Stevens's opinion,
section 307 of the Clean Air Act accorded plaintiffs a
"procedural right" justifying a relaxation of "the normal
standards of redressability and immediacy" under Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife.96 This is potentially quite significant,
as section 307 is just a jurisdictional provision, and not a
source of procedural rights. Indeed, such language has never
before been construed to establish a procedural right in a
standing case. In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens
acknowledged that for the Court to recognize a procedural
right that would justify a lowering of the standing bar,
"Congress must at least identify the injury it seeks to
vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled
to bring suit." 7 Yet section 307 does nothing of the sort. It
simply identifies which challenges to EPA rulemakings under
the Clean Air Act must be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, as opposed to those that must be filed in
regional circuit courts of appeals. Yet due to the Court's
innovative reading of this provision, the familiar
94. See generally ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION
(2008); REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
95. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
96. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517.
97. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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requirements explicated in Lujan may well present a less
daunting challenge to future litigants in regulatory matters.
As a practical matter, Massachusetts v. EPA is also a
tremendously important case because it will trigger the
federal regulation of greenhouse gases, most notably carbon
dioxide, the most ubiquitous byproduct of modem industrial
civilization. While the Court specifically eschewed directly
mandating that the EPA regulate, instead remanding the
matter back to the Agency for further proceedings given the
EPA's failure to offer a "reasoned explanation for its refusal
to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to
climate change,"" there is little doubt that such regulation
will result.
Section 202 of the Clean Air Act provides that the EPA
"shall" set emission standards for new vehicles for "any air
pollutant" the Administrator concludes causes or contributes
to air pollution, "which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare."9 Once it is established
that greenhouse gases are air pollutants for the purpose of
this provision, the EPA has little choice to regulate unless it
is prepared to argue that the accumulation of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere cannot "reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." Even were the current
EPA inclined to question this assumption, the agency's own
prior statements and actions virtually compel a finding that
greenhouse gas emissions could harm public health or
welfare. Indeed, in the very Federal Register notice in which
the Bush EPA disclaimed any authority over such emissions,
the agency nonetheless reaffirmed the need to address
climate change and "reduce the risk" posed by a warming
planet.100
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles is only the beginning, however. The same finding
98. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517.
99. Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act provides, in relevant part:
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes
of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
100. 68 Fed. Reg. 52925 (Sept. 8, 2003).
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that triggers regulation under section 202 will trigger
regulation under other provisions of the Clean Air Act as
well. Section 111, for instance, requires the Agency to set
emission performance standards for stationary sources that
"cause[] or contribute[U significantly to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare."'O° If greenhouse gases satisfy the requirements of
section 202, they will almost certainly satisfy this provision
as well.
It is also quite possible that a finding of endangerment
under section 202 could force the EPA to set national air
quality standards for greenhouse gases, giving state and
federal regulators a truly Sisyphean task. Section 108 of the
Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set such standards for any
pollutant, "emissions of which, in [the EPA Administrator's]
judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare" that is emitted into the ambient air by "numerous or
diverse mobile or stationary sources.' ' 2  The finding
necessary to trigger this section is essentially the same as
that for sections 202 and 111.
Setting a standard under section 108 would, in turn,
require states to develop and issue "state implementation
plans" for how metropolitan areas would meet the standard.
Here is where the real difficulties would begin. There is
simply no way for states, acting independently through the
state implementation plan process provided for under the
Clean Air Act or otherwise, to comply with federal standards
for ambient levels of greenhouse gases. Such gases are
dispersed throughout the global atmosphere. Carbon dioxide
emissions anywhere on the planet contribute to global
concentrations of greenhouse gases, and any benefit from
emission reductions in any one place are dispersed across the
globe. As a consequence, there is nothing any given
jurisdiction can do to comply with a federal carbon dioxide
standard unless emissions are controlled worldwide. 103
101. 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
103. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 101, 105 (2007) ("[Llocal
abatement actions pose local costs, yet deliver essentially no local climate
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Yet Massachusetts v. EPA was not the only loss for the
business community. The Court rebuffed challenges to the
application of environmental laws to various business
activities, as in S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of
Environmental Protection"°4 and Environmental Defense v.
Duke Energy."5 S.D. Warren was a rather straightforward
case in which the Court unanimously rejected S.D. Warren's
contention that a hydroelectric dam that removes and then
redeposits water from a river results in a "discharge into the
navigable waters," requiring state certification under the
Clean Water Act. Environmental Defense, on the other hand,
is a potentially significant case.
At issue in Environmental Defense was when repair,
maintenance, and upgrades at coal-fired utilities constitute a
"modification" that triggers the imposition of emission
controls under the EPA's "new source review" program. For
years, the EPA and the utility industry sparred over whether
new source review controls were triggered by an increase in a
facility's actual emissions, or just by increases in a facility's
rate of emissions. At stake was whether utilities and other
industrial facilities covered by the federal Clean Air Act
would be required to install costly pollution controls when
maintaining or upgrading older facilities. According to
various industry groups, EPA's interpretation could expose
many facilities to "new source review" requirements when
engaging in fairly routine maintenance and upkeep.'0 6 A
study released by the National Rural Electric Cooperative
Association asserted that a loss for Duke Energy would
increase energy costs and undermine power reliability,
particularly in rural areas. 107 Although the specific statutory
holding was rather narrow, the case was significant. In
benefits.").
104. S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006).
105. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy, 549 U.S. 561 (2007).
106. See Brief for Manufacturers Association Work Group as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Envtl. Def., 549 U.S. 561 (No. 05-848).
107. Bernard L. Weinstein & Terry L. Clower, Environmental Defense v.
Duke Energy: How a Supreme Court Reversal on the Interpretation of New
Source Review Could Imperil Rural America (Oct. 2006), http://www.nreca.org/D
ocuments/PublicPolicy/NewsourcereviewupdatelO-06.pdf; see also Bernard L.
Weinstein & Terry L. Clower, The EPA's Reinterpretation of New Source Review
Rules: Implications for Economic Development in Rural America (May 2002),
http://www.unt.edu/cedr/NSR.pdf.
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siding with the EPA's interpretation of its own regulations
and statutory interpretation, the Court strengthened the
agency's hand in a series of enforcement actions against
utilities under this program.
In United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority, the Court took a small step back from
protecting private waste management firms from solid waste
flow control ordinances and government-sanctioned
monopolies.10 8 In 1994, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown,
the Court had held that the Dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits local communities from enforcing local flow control
ordinances that require waste haulers to send all waste to a
single private waste processing facility.'0 9 In United Haulers,
the Court announced that the Carbone rule only applies to
private facilities, and that the Dormant Commerce Clause
does not prohibit local communities from enacting an
identical statute for the benefit of a public waste processing
facility, clearing the way for the creation of government-run
monopoly waste processing services and the balkanization of
interstate markets in waste management services. This is a
setback for business interests in two respects. First, it makes
it easier for local governments to regulate and control private
waste flows. Second, the decision may indicate the Court is
backing away from strict enforcement of Dormant Commerce
Clause limitations on local government actions that tend to
balkanize interstate markets in waste management services.
In several other cases, the Court either expanded the
government's ability to impose on business interests or
limited the ability of businesses to challenge government
regulations. In BP America Production Co. v. Burton, the
Court unanimously held that the standard six-year statute of
limitations for government contract actions did not apply to
administrative payment orders for offshore gas royalty
underpayments issued by the Minerals Management
Service." 0 Yet in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States
the Court held that the statute of limitations governing
takings claims against the federal government in the U.S.
108. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330 (2007).
109. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
110. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84 (2006).
970 [Vol:49
A PRELIMINARYASSESSMENT
Court of Federal Claims is "jurisdictional," and bars takings
claims even if waived by the government."' Thus, in these
cases the Court made it easier for the government to seek
royalty payments for private firms, but more difficult for
private firms to pursue takings claims against the
government.
This tendency to tilt the playing field against business
litigants can also be seen in Wilkie v. Robbins."2 In this case,
a private landowner sued Bureau of Land Management
employees for allegedly seeking to coerce him into giving the
government an easement across his land. The landowner
alleged a pattern of egregious conduct, ranging from selective
enforcement of federal regulations to tortuous interference
with his business and intrusion upon the privacy of his
guests, all aimed at getting him to cede a property interest.'13
This pattern of conduct, he alleged, should give rise to a
Bivens action, or other legal remedies in federal court, as the
government should not be able to retaliate against a
landowner for refusing to cede his constitutionally protected
property rights.
The Court rejected the landowner's claim, refusing to
allow for a Bivens-like action in an area where such actions
had not been recognized before. Although this case involved a
ranch owner, rather than a large corporation, it was closely
watched by industries that use or rely upon federal lands.
Several trade associations, including the Public Lands
Council and various cattlemen's associations, filed amicus
briefs on the landowner's behalf fearing that a decision for the
government could strengthen the hand of government
agencies vis-h-vis resource-dependent industries that operate
on federal lands. Thus, even if this decision did not directly
involve business interests, it adopted a rule that could be
averse to those businesses that routinely operate on federal
lands.
As a suit between two states over the interpretation of a
century-old interstate compact, New Jersey v. Delaware"'
might not seem like an environmental case that implicated
111. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008).
112. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
113. Id.
114. New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410 (2008).
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business interests at all. Yet the underlying dispute
concerned the proposed construction of a liquefied natural gas
unloading terminal to be operated by a subsidiary of British
Petroleum." 5 The legal question was whether New Jersey
could authorize the construction of an improvement that
would extend off of New Jersey's shore into Delaware's
territory. This required interpreting the 1905 Compact
between the two states, governing riparian improvements
made in the Delaware River, to determine whether Delaware
could prohibit New Jersey's planned development.
In the end, the Court sided with Delaware, holding that
New Jersey could not unilaterally authorize construction. If
the facility was to proceed, both states would have to give the
go ahead. Had the Court sought to interpret the Compact so
as to facilitate economic development, it might have refused
to adopt an interpretation of the Compact that would subject
facilities of this sort to the overlapping jurisdiction of both
states. This was the position urged by Justice Scalia in
dissent. He argued that if certain portions of the Compact
were read to give one state a veto over such projects
undertaken by the other, it would negate the utility of giving
each state exclusive jurisdiction over wharfing out projects
from its own side of the river."6 Whether or not this is the
proper interpretation of the Compact, it is the interpretation
one might have expected from a Court concerned about
facilitating business activity and economic development.
III. PRO-BUSINESS OR PRO-GOVERNMENT?
The Roberts Court's environmental decisions issued to
date suggest neither a disposition toward business nor a
hostility toward environmental regulation. The "pro-
business" position has prevailed in some cases, and lost in
others. If the relative magnitude of the cases is taken into
account, it is even more difficult to argue that the Roberts
Court has been "pro-business" in this area.
While there is no evidence of a "pro-business" orientation
in the environmental cases decided by the Roberts Court to
date, there may be evidence of something else. Business
115. Id. at 1417-18.
116. Id. at 1430 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
972 [Vol:49
A PRELIMINARYASSESSMENT
interests may not have prevailed too often, but governmental
interests did. The federal government's position prevailed in
nine of the thirteen cases in which it took a position,
including four in which the federal government adopted the
"pro-business" position. 117 In a tenth case-United Haulers
Association-a local government prevailed against private
parties."' Thus, in ten of fourteen cases-over two-thirds of
the relevant environmental cases-the government position
prevailed.
This pattern is even more striking when one considers
the cases in which the federal government lost. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court rejected the position
advocated by the federal government." 9  Yet the case's
outcome can still be considered "pro-government" in many
respects. Massachusetts and other state governments were
among the prevailing parties, and the Court stressed the
importance of that fact in resolving the standing issue. It
announced that state governments, as sovereign entities,
were entitled to a "special solicitude" in the standing inquiry,
thereby privileging state litigants over others.
Massachusetts v. EPA is "pro-government" in another
respect: the decision greatly expanded federal regulatory
authority and will result in a significant increase in federal
environmental regulation. Further, in holding that
greenhouse gases are subject to regulation as "pollutants"
under the Clean Air Act, and forcing the EPA to base its
decision on whether to regulate such emissions upon its
assessment of existing climate science, the Court effectively
ensured that the EPA will regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from motor vehicles, as well as from stationary sources,
including many emission sources which have never before
been regulated under federal law.
117. These four cases are National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders
of Wildlife, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Winter, Summers v. Earth
Island Institute, and Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.
118. The remaining cases, New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410 (2008),
and Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008), pitted two states against
each other and two private parties against each other respectively.
In the former case, however, the court adopted a "pro-government" position
insofar as it approved a compact interpretation that provides for overlapping
and duplicative jurisdiction.
119. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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The federal government lost in Atlantic Research, but
this decision has no impact on the federal government's
ability to implement the federal Superfund program. If
anything, by reaffirming the ability of companies to seek cost
recovery from other potentially responsible parties for
voluntary cleanup actions, it serves the government's broader
interest in ensuring the quick and cost-effective cleanup of
hazardous waste sites. 2 ' The government nominally lost in
Rockwell International as well, but it is again difficult to
argue that the decision meaningfully compromised the federal
government's interests. By narrowing the scope of the
"original source" exception to the "public disclosure bar" on
federal court jurisdiction over qui tam actions under the False
Claims Act, the Court did not prevent the federal government
from continuing to pursue such claims. To the contrary, in
Rockwell the Court left the action by the Attorney General
against Rockwell in place and suggested it would be "bizarre"
to set aside the government's judgment because of a lack of
jurisdiction over the qui tam relator's claim. 121
Rapanos is the only decision of the Roberts Court that
imposed any meaningful limit on federal regulatory
authority. Yet, as discussed above, the impact of this decision
is relatively modest. The disposition of Rapanos leaves the
federal government with ample room to impose extensive
regulation on wetlands should the EPA and Army Corps of
Engineers elect to revise their regulations. The Court
certainly hinted that federal regulation of private land use is
subject to federalism limitations, but it refrained from
explicitly imposing such a limit, further blunting the impact
of the holding. 122
At the time of this writing, the Court has heard
arguments in, but has yet to decide, two more potentially
120. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, United States v. Atlantic Researcu The Supreme
Court Almost Gets It Right, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10810, 10816 (2007) ("Atlantic
Research was an important step in ensuring that the remedial objectives of
CERCLA are satisfied.").
121. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 477-78 (2007).
122. Indeed, John Rapanos may not have considered the decision much of a
victory, as he ended up paying a $150,000 settlement and agreeing to construct
100 acres of new wetlands to compensate for those he destroyed. See Ed White,
Deal Reached in Marathon Wetlands Case, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), Jan. 1,
2009, at B5.
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significant environmental cases. These pending cases are
unlikely to disturb this paper's conclusions, however. The
federal government is a party in each, and has adopted the
"pro-business" position in one. Thus, even if the Court adopts
business-friendly positions in both of these cases, it will still
appear that the Roberts Court reaches "pro-government"
results in environmental cases more often than "pro-business"
results.
CONCLUSION
There is no meaningful evidence that the Roberts Court
has adopted a substantive pro-business orientation in its
environmental cases-at least not in those cases decided thus
far. This is a tentative conclusion, however. There are two
environmental cases still pending this term, concerning
Superfund liability and the scope of the Clean Water Act's
permitting requirements. Additional litigation on other
environmental questions in the years to come could also alter
the picture, particularly once the Court begins to hear
challenges to the Obama Administration's environmental
initiatives.
The lack of a pro-business orientation in the
environmental context does not mean the Court is not more
business-friendly in other areas, perhaps such as in
preemption, arbitration, or securities litigation. Yet while
there are no signs of a business-friendly approach to
environmental cases, there are signs the Court tends to favor
governmental interests, and those of the federal government
in particular. Thus far in the Roberts Court, governmental
interests have prevailed in environmental cases with greater
frequency than business interests. If this pattern continues,
then whether the Court hands down business-friendly
decisions may depend on whether the political branches are
or continue to be receptive to business concerns.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Environmental Cases Heard by the Roberts Court
Pro-
Business
Case Issue Vote Outcome
S.D. Warren Co. Whether hydroelectric dam causes 9-0 No
v. Maine Board of
Environmental
Protection
547 U.S. 370
(2006)
Rapanos v.
United States
547 U.S. 715
(2006)
BP America
Production Co. v.
Burton
549 U.S. 84
(2006)
Rockwell
International
Corp. v. United
States
549 U.S. 457
(2007)
Massachusetts v.
EPA
549 U.S. 497
(2007)
Environmental
Defense v. Duke
Energy Corp.
549 U.S. 561
(2007)
"discharge into the navigable
waters" requiring state
certification under Clean Water
Act
Whether (and when) wetlands
adjacent to tributaries of navigable
waters are "waters of the United
States" under the Clean Water Act
and applicable federal regulations
Whether six-year statute of
limitations for government
contract actions applies to
administrative payment orders for
gas royalty underpayments issued
by the Minerals Management
Service
Whether "original source"
requirement of False Claims Act is
jurisdictional
Whether EPA has authority to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions
under the Clean Air Act
5-4 Yes
7-0* No
6-2t Yes
5-4 No
Whether EPA is required to apply 5-4
same definition of "modification"
for promulgation of PSD and
NSPS standards under Clean Air
Act
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Table 1. Environmental Cases Heard by the Roberts Court (continued)
Pro-
Business
Case Issue Vote Outcome
United Haulers Whether county flow control 6-3 No
Association v.
Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste
Management
Authority
550 U.S. 330
(2007)
United States v.
Atlantic Research
Corp.
127 S. Ct. 2331
(2007)
National
Association of
Home Builders v.
Defenders of
Wildlife
127 S. Ct. 2518
(2007)
Wilkie v. Robbins
127 S. Ct. 2588
(2007)
John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v.
United States
128 S. Ct. 750
(2008)
New Jersey v.
Delaware
128 S. Ct. 1410
(2008)
Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker
128 S. Ct. 2605
(2008)
ordinances requiring use of state-
owned waste facilities violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause
Whether CERCLA provides
potentially responsible party a
cause of action to recover costs of
voluntary cleanup
Whether consultation
requirements under Endangered
Species Act apply to non-
discretionary federal agency
decisions governed by explicit
statutory criteria.
Whether landowner has private
cause of action against Bureau of
Land Management officials for
effort to extort easement
Whether statute of limitations for
takings claims against federal
government is jurisdictional
Whether interstate compact
granted New Jersey exclusive
jurisdiction over riparian
improvements extending beyond
low-water mark
Whether federal maritime
common law limits amount of
punitive damages awarded in suit
for oil spill
9-0 Yes
5-4 Yes
7-2 No
6-2t No
5-3t Yes
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Table 1. Environmental Cases Heard by the Roberts Court (continued)
Pro-
Business
Case Issue Vote Outcome
Winter v. Natural Whether Court of Appeals erred 6-3 Yes
Resources Defense
Council
129 S. Ct. 365
(2008)
Summers v. Earth
Island Institute
129 S. Ct. 1142
(2009)
Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc.
No. 07-588, 2009
WL 838242 (U.S.
Apr. 1, 2009)
Coeur Alaska, Inc.
v. Southeast
Alaska
Conservation
Council
Burlington
Northern and
Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. United
States
in affirming preliminary
injunction against use of Naval
sonar for failure to comply with
National Environmental Policy
Act
Whether environmental
organization has standing to
challenge a change in Forest
Service regulations absent live
dispute over concrete application
of rule
Whether EPA may use cost-
benefit analysis in determining
what constitutes the "best
technology available" to limit
environmental effects of cooling
water intake structures under the
Clean Water Act
Pending Cases
Whether the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers may issue a permit
under section 404 for discharge of
fill material otherwise subject to
effluent limitations under the
Clean Water Act
Whether (and when) it is
appropriate to impose joint and
several liability or apportion
damages under CERCLA
5-4 Yes
6-3 Yes
* Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer did not participate.
t Justice Breyer did not participate.
t Justice Alito did not participate
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